June 23, 1978 - Air Canada Flight 189 Crashes During Landing in Toronto

On June 23, 1978, you'd find Air Canada Flight 189 attempting a routine takeoff from Toronto's Pearson International Airport when a burst tire on the right main landing gear triggered a chain of events that sent the DC-9-32 plunging into Etobicoke Creek ravine. The crew's delayed abort response and failed braking couldn't stop the aircraft in time. Two passengers died, 105 were injured, and ruptured fuel tanks narrowly avoided ignition. There's much more to this pivotal aviation story worth uncovering.

Key Takeaways

Air Canada Flight 189, a DC-9-32 (CF-TLV), crashed on June 23, 1978, during an aborted takeoff at Toronto Pearson International Airport.
A tire burst on the right main landing gear at approximately 145–149 knots, triggering an unsafe gear warning light.
The captain hesitated four seconds before initiating the abort at 154 knots, contributing to the runway overrun.
The aircraft plunged down a 15-meter embankment into the Etobicoke Creek ravine, killing 2 and injuring 105 of 107 occupants.
Ruptured fuel tanks did not ignite, preventing greater casualties; the crash prompted improved tire inspection and emergency braking training.

What Was Air Canada Flight 189?

On June 26, 1978, Air Canada Flight 189 took off from Toronto Pearson International Airport (YYZ) on what was supposed to be a routine domestic service from Ottawa to Vancouver, with stops in Toronto and Winnipeg.

The aircraft, a DC-9-32 registered as CF-TLV, carried 107 occupants and was powered by two Pratt & Whitney JT8D-7A engines. It had accumulated 25,476 total flight hours since its 1968 manufacture.

What began as an ordinary departure turned into a catastrophic overrun, exposing serious gaps in pilot training and passenger evacuation procedures.

The crash killed two passengers, injured 105 others, and destroyed the aircraft. The two fatalities were seated in the area where the fuselage split into three pieces upon impact with the ravine.

Investigators later identified multiple contributing factors, making Flight 189 a pivotal case in aviation safety history. Notably, the aircraft came to rest in the Etobicoke Creek ravine, the same location that would later be the site of another runway overrun accident 27 years later.

The DC-9-32 at the Center of the Air Canada Flight 189 Crash

At the heart of the Air Canada Flight 189 disaster was a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32, registered as CF-TLV, which Air Canada had taken delivery of in April 1968. By the time of the crash, the aircraft had logged 25,476 flight hours. The DC-9-32's airframe metallurgy supported a stretched fuselage and larger wingspan, while its flight control ergonomics reflected improved flap systems over earlier DC-9 variants.

Key characteristics of CF-TLV included:

Two Pratt & Whitney JT8D-7A engines capable of delivering reverse thrust during aborted takeoffs
A full fuel load that, despite tank ruptures, never ignited during the violent crash
A fuselage that ultimately fractured into three distinct pieces upon ravine impact, causing both fatalities

The aircraft was operating as scheduled flight 189 on a route from Ottawa to Vancouver, with planned stops at Toronto and Winnipeg before the disaster unfolded during the Toronto departure. The overrun sequence saw the aircraft exit the runway at 70 knots, rolling 139 meters before descending a 15-meter embankment. The fact that ruptured fuel tanks did not ignite stands in stark contrast to disasters like the TWA Flight 800 explosion, where a spark igniting fuel vapors in a center fuel tank killed all 230 people on board.

Why the Takeoff on June 26, 1978 Went Wrong

The morning of June 26, 1978, began routinely for Air Canada Flight 189's crew, who'd boarded at Toronto Pearson International Airport at 07:45 following their arrival from Ottawa.

Captain Reginald W. Stewart advanced the throttles at 08:08, and 46 seconds later, a tire on the DC-9-32 burst at 145 knots. Rubber chunks tore into the right main landing gear, triggering an unsafe gear warning light.

The first officer immediately shouted "gear is unsafe, right gear," with 4,000 feet of runway remaining. Captain Stewart's pilot hesitation — a critical four-second delay — meant the abort didn't begin until 154 knots.

Investigators later emphasized that stronger tire inspection protocols could've identified the compromised tire beforehand, potentially preventing the disaster that followed.

The Runway Overrun and Plunge Into Etobicoke Creek

Despite deploying spoilers and reverse thrust, Captain Stewart couldn't bring the DC-9-32 to a stop in time. The runway overrun carried the aircraft 4,000 feet down the remaining runway before it crossed the threshold by another 457 feet. At 60 knots, the plane plunged off the embankment into the ravine impact zone below — Etobicoke Creek, visible from Highway 401.

Imagine witnessing:

A commercial jet disappearing over a runway's edge at highway speeds
The fuselage splitting into three pieces as it struck the ravine floor
Fuel spilling from ruptured tanks without igniting, preventing a catastrophic fire

The aircraft logged 25,476 flight hours before investigators wrote it off as destroyed — a total loss that nobody walked away from unshaken. The tire burst on the right main gear at 145–149 knots, likely caused by wear, triggering a cascade of failures including damage to the landing gear and a loss of power in the right engine that made stopping the aircraft impossible.

Two Dead, 105 Injured: The Human and Physical Toll

Of 107 people aboard Flight 189, none escaped uninjured — two passengers died where the fuselage split at the forward section, and the remaining 105 sustained injuries from the impact into Etobicoke Creek's ravine. The fuselage breaking into three pieces concentrated the fatal force at that forward split point, claiming both lives there.

Survivor testimonies described the violent rupture and sudden plunge as the DC-9 struck the embankment at 60 knots. The medical response mobilized quickly, reaching the ravine site where 102 passengers and 5 crew members awaited help. Despite ruptured fuel tanks carrying a full load, no fire ignited — a critical factor that prevented the death toll from rising far beyond two. Every survivor carried physical evidence of how destructive that impact truly was.

What Investigators Found After Air Canada Flight 189

Investigators piecing together the wreckage in Etobicoke Creek's ravine quickly identified a chain of failures that turned a routine departure into disaster. The right main landing gear tire burst at 145 knots, launching debris into the gear assembly. Captain Stewart's four-second delay before aborting cost critical stopping distance, and poor braking procedures training worsened the outcome.

Key findings painted a grim picture:

Rubber chunks tearing through the landing gear mechanism like shrapnel, triggering warning lights
The aircraft plunging over the runway threshold at 60 knots, splitting into three pieces across the ravine floor
Ruptured fuel tanks surrounding wreckage with jet fuel, yet no fire igniting

Investigators demanded stricter tire inspection protocols and overhauled emergency braking procedures training for all flight crews.

What Air Canada Flight 189 Exposed About Runway Safety

The crash of Air Canada Flight 189 laid bare a dangerous gap in runway safety planning that airport authorities had long ignored. Runway 23L ended at an embankment dropping directly into Etobicoke Creek ravine, leaving zero margin for error if an aircraft overran the threshold. At 60 knots, the plane plunged off that edge, and yet authorities didn't expand the overshoot zone afterward.

That inaction proved costly. Twenty-seven years later, Air France Flight 358 overran the same runway and fell into the same ravine. Both crashes exposed the same failure: runway safety planning hadn't accounted for real-world emergencies. You can't claim strong emergency preparedness when a known hazard sits at a runway's end and nobody acts to eliminate it. Much like the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan, which was described as a transition rather than a resolution, institutional responses to known dangers often reframe the problem rather than eliminate it, leaving long-term outcomes and stability in serious doubt.