December 7, 1937 - Battles Intensify Around Nanjing During the Second Sino Japanese War

By December 7, 1937, you're watching Nanjing's fate seal itself in real time. Chiang Kai-shek fled by plane that day, leaving General Tang Shengzhi commanding roughly 100,000 undertrained, demoralized troops against 160,000 battle-hardened Japanese soldiers already closing around the city. Supply lines had fractured, communications had collapsed, and civilian evacuation had gutted morale. Japan's momentum from Shanghai made Nanjing's fall almost inevitable — and the full story of how it unraveled is far more complex than you'd expect.

Key Takeaways

Chiang Kai-shek departed Nanjing by plane on December 7, leaving commander Tang Shengzhi without original political authority.
Tang Shengzhi led approximately 100,000 largely untrained, poorly equipped troops while privately doubting their defensive capabilities.
Supply shortages and communication breakdowns paralyzed Chinese coordination, fragmenting resistance as Japanese forces closed in.
Japanese forces had already encircled roughly 300,000 Chinese troops near the capital by December 8.
Battle of Shanghai had gutted Chinese reserves, leaving exhausted, demoralized defenders unable to mount effective resistance.

Why Japan's Victory at Shanghai Made Nanjing the Inevitable Next Target

After three grueling months, Japan finally captured Shanghai in November 1937, and the victory fundamentally reshaped the war's trajectory. You can see how Japan's momentum became unstoppable — exhausted Chinese forces collapsed through defensive lines at Wufu and Xicheng within days, leaving little standing between Japanese troops and the capital.

Nanjing wasn't just another city. As the Republic of China's capital, its capture represented enormous political leverage, potentially forcing the Chinese government into economic and political submission. Japan's high command recognized this instantly, authorizing the Nanjing campaign immediately after Shanghai fell. General Matsui believed that capturing Nanjing would force Chinese surrender.

The Chinese had fought desperately at Shanghai partly to attract Western sympathy through a calculated propaganda campaign, but that strategy proved inconclusive. Japan's superior air power, tanks, and outflanking tactics had already decided the war's next chapter. The Battle of Shanghai, which lasted from August 13 to November 26, 1937, was the first of 22 major engagements between the National Revolutionary Army and the Imperial Japanese Army during the war. Just weeks earlier, on December 11, 1937, Canada's national French radio network had launched, marking a milestone in a country far removed from the escalating devastation unfolding across China.

Japanese Troop Movements Closing In on Nanjing

With Shanghai's fall on November 11, 1937, Japan's Central China Area Army launched an immediate march on Nanjing — 190 miles in five weeks. You'd watch 160,000 Japanese troops overwhelm Chinese resistance at every turn, executing captured soldiers and terrorizing civilians into mass evacuations across the region.

China's scorched earth tactics created supply shortages that slowed Japan's momentum but couldn't stop it. By early December, General Iwane Matsui's forces had breached multiple Chinese defense lines, occupying Jurong and Chunhua, just 15 miles southeast of Nanjing. The chaos surrounding Nanjing's imminent fall mirrored other wartime urban crises, where civilian crowd control collapsed under the pressure of mass military mobilization and displacement.

A pincer movement encircled roughly 300,000 Chinese troops near the capital by December 8.

On December 9, Japanese forces arrived outside the city gates, positioning artillery within striking range of Nanjing's outer defenses — the final assault was imminent. The Japanese Tenth Army had already drawn up contingency plans that included intensive aerial bombing with incendiary bombs and mustard-gas canisters should direct assault prove insufficient.

The atrocities that would follow Nanjing's fall were staggering, with estimates suggesting 100,000 to 300,000 Chinese civilians and soldiers killed in the weeks after the city's capture on December 13, 1937.

Matsui vs. Tang Shengzhi: The Commanders Who Decided Nanjing's Defense

Two commanders with starkly different mandates now stood on opposite sides of Nanjing's walls. Matsui commanded the Central China Area Army with clear purpose — capture Nanjing, force China's surrender, end the war. His command decisions reflected calculated aggression: he dropped surrender demands by aircraft on December 9, waited for Chinese envoys at Zhongshan Gate, then launched his full assault at 1:00 pm after receiving no response.

Tang Shengzhi's leadership contrasts sharply with Matsui's confidence. Appointed just days earlier, Tang led 100,000 largely untrained troops while privately doubting their capabilities. You can see the contradiction in his actions — publicly proclaiming defense to the death while deploying his elite 36th Division at the docks, not against the enemy, but to prevent his own men from fleeing. On December 7, Chiang Kai-shek departed Nanjing by plane, leaving Tang to manage a deteriorating defense without the political authority that had originally insisted the capital be held at all costs. The fall of Nanjing on December 13 would ultimately unleash six weeks of mass executions, assaults, and looting, resulting in up to 300,000 casualties among Chinese civilians and disarmed soldiers.

Why China's Nanjing Defenses Were Already Crumbling by December 1937

By the time Japanese forces reached Nanjing's outer defenses in early December 1937, China's garrison was already breaking apart from within. The Battle of Shanghai had gutted Chinese reserves, leaving exhausted, demoralized troops facing superior Japanese firepower with dwindling options.

You'd recognize these warning signs of collapse:

Civilian evacuation emptied the city, stripping away any semblance of normalcy and crushing troop morale further
Supply shortages left defenders undermanned and outgunned against Japan's mountain artillery and overwhelming numbers
Communication breakdowns paralyzed coordination, turning organized resistance into fragmented chaos

Tang Shengzhi privately acknowledged victory was impossible. His commanders agreed unanimously. When Japanese forces breached the Fukuo Line by December 9th, Nanjing's fate wasn't a question of *if*—only when.

The withdrawal of Chinese armed forces from key positions within the city left Nanjing critically exposed, removing the last professional military barrier standing between Japanese troops and the civilian population.

The Elite Training Division's Last Stand Outside the City Wall

Germany's finest infantry doctrine lived inside the Training Division—but doctrine alone couldn't hold Nanjing's walls forever.

You're watching one of China's super-elite units execute its final sortie near Guanghua Gate at dawn on December 9. A full battalion engages Japan's 36th Infantry Regiment just outside the city wall, using illumination and concentrated small-arms fire to repel the advance. It works—temporarily. Half that battalion becomes casualties before survivors pull back inside the fortifications.

Their urban withdrawal doesn't signal defeat yet. These German-trained soldiers had bought critical hours, delaying Matsui's full assault ordered on December 10 and protecting a key gate long enough for other defenders to reposition. General Alexander von Falkenhausen had personally overseen the modernization of these divisions, making the 88th among China's most capable.

But communications were collapsing, casualties were mounting, and Chiang Kai-shek's abandonment order was already coming. Adding to the chaos of those final days, a battalion of roughly 3,000 Chinese soldiers assigned to defend a Yangtze River bridge sector reportedly vanished without trace, leaving behind weapons and still-warm fires but no signs of struggle and no credible explanation.

How Japan's Generals Disobeyed Orders and Pushed Past the Restriction Line

While the Training Division's survivors were pulling back through Guanghua Gate, a separate crisis was already unfolding in Japan's own chain of command—one that would define how the battle for Nanjing actually unfolded.

Yanagawa's 10th Army crossed the operation restriction line on November 19, committing outright command insubordination. Matsui tried restraining his subordinates but ultimately lobbied high command himself. Tokyo didn't approve the Nanjing operation until December 1—after field units had already advanced.

Here's what you need to understand about the breakdown:

Yanagawa advanced toward Nanjing before receiving authorization
Prince Asaka issued orders to "kill all captives," directly contradicting Matsui
Matsui's ethical culpability grew as he demanded a triumphal entry while atrocities unfolded beneath him

Matsui had spent decades cultivating deep ties with Chinese leaders and was a committed pan-Asianist who genuinely believed in Sino-Japanese partnership against Western imperialism, making his role in the catastrophic fall of Nanjing a profound and tragic contradiction of everything he had once stood for. Despite issuing pre-invasion orders to spare civilians, avoid unnecessary city damage, and take combatants as POWs, the directives ultimately failed to reach or restrain troops on the ground. Much like the Doctrine of Discovery had provided European powers a legal framework to override Indigenous sovereignty and justify territorial seizure, Japan's field commanders operated under their own assumed authority—advancing, claiming, and acting well before any formal authorization arrived.

The 48 Hours That Would Seal Nanjing's Fate

The Chinese government's departure from Nanjing on December 1 set a countdown in motion that would leave the city's fate in the hands of demoralized troops and a small international committee. Chiang Kai-shek stayed until December 7, but civilian evacuation had already stripped the city of its leadership. International committee roles fell to John Rabe's group, now responsible for what remained of civilian oversight.

Tang Shengzhi's untrained defenders barely held their positions as Japanese forces reached the city walls on December 9. When no Chinese envoy answered Japan's surrender demand, Generals Matsui and Asaka ordered the attack at 1300 hours. You'd watch 48 hours of fierce combat unravel Nanjing's defenses entirely, pushing most Chinese units into a disorganized collapse with little hope of escape. Compounding the chaos, many Chinese troops had allegedly stripped their uniforms and mingled with the civilian population prior to the city's capture, further blurring the line between combatants and civilians in the days that followed.