June 13, 1935 - Communist Forces Regroup During the Long March

On June 12–13, 1935, you can trace one of the Long March's most critical moments to the linkup between the First and Fourth Red Armies near Xiaojin. The First Army had collapsed from 130,000 troops to roughly 10,000 survivors, battered by starvation, disease, and relentless Nationalist encirclement. That junction combined forces into approximately 70,000–80,000 personnel, keeping the Communist revolution barely alive. What happened next would fracture that fragile unity in ways nobody could've predicted.

Key Takeaways

• On June 12, 1935, the First Army's vanguard met the Fourth Army's scouting party near Xiaojin, initiating the critical linkup.
• Combined forces after the linkup reached roughly 70,000–80,000 personnel, restoring momentum for the continued push north toward Shaanxi.
• Immediate supply sharing of food, clothing, and ammunition between the two armies relieved critical shortages following devastating losses.
• Sichuan blockades by Nationalist forces made Maoergai the only viable regrouping position available to Communist forces in June 1935.
• The First Army had been reduced to approximately 10,000 troops after crossing mountainous terrain, reflecting catastrophic attrition during the march.

How Close Was the Red Army to Total Collapse in June 1935?

By June 1935, the Chinese Red Army had shrunk from 86,000 troops to roughly 15,000–20,000 effectives—an 80% attrition rate driven largely by starvation, typhus, and desertion rather than battlefield losses. You'd find no heavy weapons, minimal ammunition, and soldiers eating grass, leather, and nettles just to survive.

The Grasslands crossing alone killed up to 6,000 men through drowning, exhaustion, and exposure. Desertion peaked at over 1,000 soldiers fleeing daily, accelerating morale collapse across both front armies. Over 300,000 Nationalist troops encircled the survivors while bombing runs intensified pressure from above.

Historians estimate the army faced less than a 20% survival chance without an immediate northward route shift. Collapse wasn't merely possible—it was imminent. The Soviet Red Army, itself born from crisis in 1918, had similarly relied on blocking units authorized to shoot retreating soldiers without permission as a brutal measure to prevent total disintegration.

Just years later, Stalin's Great Terror of 1937–38 would devastate that same Soviet military leadership, with over half repressed among the 1,844 officers holding general-grade ranks, directly weakening Red Army effectiveness at the outset of World War II.

What Forced the Communist Retreat to Maoergai?

The Fifth Encirclement Campaign had already bled the Red Army dry in Jiangxi before a single step of the Long March was taken. Chiang Kai-shek's blockhouse lines and overwhelming numbers forced abandonment of Ruijin on October 10, 1934, pushing over 86,000 troops westward under constant pursuit.

You'd see the retreat compounding itself at every turn. KMT forces blocked the original route toward He Long's forces in Hubei, redirecting columns through Guangdong, Hunan, and eventually Sichuan. Supply shortages stripped units of combat effectiveness, while terrain fatigue from crossing fourteen provinces over roughly 10,000 kilometers ground soldiers down further. By June 1935, Nationalist blockades in Sichuan eliminated consolidation options, making Maoergai the only viable regrouping position available. The Zunyi Conference in January 1935 had already reshuffled military authority, stripping Bo Gu and Otto Braun of effective command while elevating Mao's influence over strategic decisions that shaped the route northward. At Songpan, Mao's forces linked with Zhang Guotao's armies, triggering a leadership struggle over whether to push east toward Shaanxi or west toward Tibet that would fracture the Communist command structure entirely.

How Did the First and Fourth Red Armies Finally Link Up on the Long March?

Maoergai's geography had funneled both armies toward an inevitable meeting point, and by June 1935, that convergence finally happened.

On June 12, your First Army vanguard encountered a Fourth Army scouting party near Xiaojin, roughly 75 air miles north of the Luding Bridge crossing you'd fought so hard to secure.

That terrain navigation through wild high mountains had cost the First Army enormously, shrinking it to around 10,000 soldiers from an original 130,000.

Zhang Guotao's Fourth Army, still strong at 60,000 to 70,000 troops, immediately began supply sharing with your exhausted, tattered veterans.

Food, clothing, and ammunition changed hands, restoring critical momentum.

Combined, both forces reached roughly 70,000 to 80,000 personnel, positioning the revolution for its continued push northward toward Shaanxi. The Zunyi Conference in January 1935 had already reshaped the revolution's direction, confirming Mao Zedong's undisputed leadership of both the Red Army and the Communist Party of China. Meanwhile, the Red Twenty-fifth Army, numbering fewer than 3,000 men, had separately marched northwest toward Shaanxi after abandoning parts of the O-y-wan soviet in November 1934.

How Did the Mao-Zhang Feud Almost Tear the Long March Apart?

When the First and Fourth Red Armies linked up at Maogong in June 1935, their reunion quickly unraveled into a bitter command struggle that nearly destroyed the revolution from within.

This leadership rivalry between Mao and Zhang Guotao produced a devastating strategy clash that fractured communist unity.

Here's what made their feud so dangerous:

• Zhang demanded Chen Changhao replace Zhou Enlai as political commissar
• Zhou relinquished his position under mounting factional pressure
• No agreement emerged over northward versus southwestern movement
• Both armies ultimately separated, weakening overall military strength
• Mao's contingent pressed north while Zhang moved southwest independently

You're witnessing a revolution nearly consuming itself.

Personal ambition and competing visions drove these commanders apart precisely when unified leadership mattered most. Mao's decisive response was to lead the central authority and Third Front Army north overnight, allowing those who wished to follow central leadership north while permitting others to return with Zhang. Mao had already consolidated his position as CCP chairman at the Zunyi Conference in 1935, making Zhang's challenge a direct threat to recently established central authority.

Why Did the Long March Split Into Two Separate Routes?

Route disagreements between Mao and Otto Braun didn't emerge from personal conflict alone—they reflected fundamentally incompatible strategic visions. Braun pushed eastern Guizhou for defensive positioning, while Mao recognized that western Guizhou's lighter KMT presence offered genuine tactical breathing room. Zhou Enlai backed Mao, effectively stripping Braun's command authority during critical planning meetings.

Terrain tactics drove the eventual split into multiple groups. Near the Xinfeng River, you'd see commanders deliberately fragment their forces to confuse pursuing Nationalist units, with separated columns reuniting in southern Hunan on November 16, 1934. Western routes also carried political symbolism—proximity to Sichuan signaled forward momentum toward northwestern China and potential Soviet supply lines. The Zunyi Conference ultimately formalized what battlefield realities had already demonstrated: Mao's strategic judgment commanded genuine operational authority. In June 1935, Zhang Guotao's force rejoined the main army before a power struggle at Mao'ergai led to two separate routes, with Zhang's group heading southwest while Mao's main body pressed on toward northern Shaanxi.

The entire march unfolded across extraordinarily punishing terrain, including the Great Snowy Mountains where heights reached up to 5,000 metres, exposing soldiers to altitude sickness, frostbite and avalanches that claimed lives alongside battlefield casualties.

How the Maoergai Split Determined the Long March's Final Outcome

The split at Maoergai in mid-1935 didn't just fracture Communist forces—it determined who'd control China's revolutionary future.

Zhang Guotao's southwestern gamble cost him everything. His Fourth Front Army absorbed catastrophic losses while Mao's leadership consolidation and logistical innovation carried survivors northward to Yan'an. By October 1935, Mao arrived with 8,000 survivors, his authority uncontested.

Consider what that separation meant:

• Zhang's shattered army couldn't challenge Mao's dominance
• Heavy Nationalist casualties eliminated Zhang's political leverage
• Mao's northern route proved strategically superior
• Yan'an's proximity to Soviet borders provided critical protection
• Zhang's remnants eventually submitted to Mao's command

You're witnessing a decisive power shift. One junction, one irreconcilable disagreement, and fifty years of Communist governance fell into a single man's hands. The Zunyi Conference had already set this trajectory in motion, electing Mao to the Politburo Standing Committee and ousting the Soviet-trained faction that had long undermined his authority. Zhang's final undoing came when his ill-fated campaign into Xinjiang ended in destruction at the hands of GMD-backed Muslim warlords, stripping him of the military base he needed to contest Mao's supremacy.