November 13, 1937 - Nanjing Threatened as Japanese Forces Advance During War

On November 13, 1937, you can trace the moment Japan's victory in Shanghai transformed into a direct threat against Nanjing, as Japanese commanders ordered their forces to pursue retreating Chinese troops toward China's capital without pause. Their advance collapsed Chinese defensive lines at Kunshan, Wufu, and Xicheng within days, turning the 170-mile corridor into a killing field. What unfolded next would become one of history's most devastating chapters, and there's far more to uncover.

Key Takeaways

• Japanese commanders ordered pursuit of retreating Chinese forces toward Nanjing on November 12, 1937, one day before the city faced direct threat.
• The Shanghai Expeditionary Army advanced from the east while the 10th Army pushed from the south, forming a deadly pincer movement.
• Japanese forces collapsed Chinese defensive lines at Kunshan, Wufu, and Xicheng within days of beginning their advance toward Nanjing.
• Approximately 70,000 Japanese troops actively participated in the fighting, supported by tanks, artillery, and aerial operations across the 170-mile corridor.
• Nanjing was strategically targeted as the Republic of China's capital and symbol of Chinese nationalism, to break Chiang Kai-shek's power.

The Fall of Shanghai and Japan's March Toward Nanjing

November 13, 1937 - Nanjing Threatened as Japanese Forces Advance During War

The Fall of Shanghai and Japan's March Toward Nanjing

The Battle of Shanghai began on August 13, 1937, when Japanese Special Naval Landing Force Marines—initially 1,300 strong—clashed with China's German-trained 87th and 88th Divisions.

Despite fierce Chinese resistance, Japan overwhelmed the defenders, raising its flag over North Station by March 1932's conclusion.

The Shanghai aftermath left the city in ruins.

Now, you're watching Japan's next move unfold.

On November 12, 1937, Japanese commanders ordered pursuit of retreating Chinese forces toward Nanjing.

The Shanghai Expeditionary Army advanced from the east while the 10th Army pushed from the south, forming a deadly pincer.

Military logistics strained immediately—Chinese defensive lines at Kunshan, Wufu, and Xicheng collapsed within days as Japan's relentless advance continued westward.

By the start of December, the Central China Area Army had grown to over 160,000 men, with approximately 70,000 actively participating in the fighting toward Nanjing.

General Iwane Matsui had declared as early as August 15, 1937, that Japan's mission was to capture Nanjing in order to break Chiang Kai-shek's power.

Why Did Nanjing Become Japan's Next Major Target?

With Shanghai fallen, Japan's military commanders fixed their sights on a far more consequential prize. Nanjing wasn't just another city — it was the Republic of China's capital, chosen specifically to symbolize Chinese nationalism's rebirth. Capturing it would tell the world that nationalist resistance was finished.

Japan's pan-asianism ideology drove much of this ambition. Military leaders believed they'd a duty to dismantle Chinese sovereignty and establish regional dominance throughout East Asia. General Iwane Matsui was convinced that Nanjing's fall would collapse the entire Nationalist Government.

The city's symbolic importance made it the obvious target. You'd understand why controlling it meant controlling the narrative — demoralizing Chinese forces, weakening Chiang Kai-shek's legitimacy, and opening East China's resources to Japanese expansion. The massacre and its associated atrocities fit a broader pattern of Japanese war crimes along the Lower Yangtze River that had already begun during the Battle of Shanghai.

Japan had expanded into northeast China from 1931, operating within a broader framework of Pan-Asian imperial ambitions that positioned Chinese sovereignty as an obstacle to regional dominance. By the time Japanese forces approached Nanjing, the political landscape of China was already deeply fragmented, with nationalists concentrated in the center and south while Japanese influence had taken hold across much of the north. Japan's wartime economy increasingly depended on extracting resources from occupied territories, and its government had passed measures to regulate and direct industrial production standards in ways that prioritized military output over civilian efficiency.

Japan's Strategy for Taking Nanjing After Shanghai

Once Shanghai fell, Japan's Central China Area Army — under General Iwane Matsui — wasted no time pivoting toward Nanjing. The Japanese strategy combined rapid maneuver logistics with a devastating pincer movement called "encirclement and annihilation," pushing 160,000 troops across 300 km in just five weeks. Japanese reinforcements like the 3rd and 11th Divisions were reportedly dispatched hastily with limited heavy weapons and half-month rations.

Here's what made their approach so effective:

• Speed over orders — Subordinates raced ahead, capturing key cities days before schedule
• Multi-directional pressure — The Shanghai Expeditionary Army attacked from the east while the 10th Army closed from the south
• Sealed escape routes — A naval squadron blocked the Yangtze River, trapping nearly 300,000 Chinese troops

Nanjing's 1937 Population Crisis as Refugees Flooded the Capital

By the time Japanese forces began their march on Nanjing, the city was already buckling under a population crisis. Before 1937, roughly 250,000 residents called it home. That number exploded past one million as refugee demographics shifted dramatically, with displaced civilians flooding in from war-torn regions.

Official surveys recorded over one million civilians by March 1937. Yet urban overcrowding worsened when the Chinese Army's scorched earth policy burned surrounding villages, pushing rural refugees inward starting December 7. Daily refugee influxes added approximately 30,000 people by occupation's arrival.

Wealthier residents fled after August bombings, while the poor couldn't escape. You'd have found a city of contradictions — mass departures and mass arrivals happening simultaneously, leaving estimates ranging wildly from 150,000 to over 500,000 by late November 1937. Of the civilians who remained when Japanese forces arrived, an estimated 200,000 to 350,000 would ultimately lose their lives in the weeks that followed.

Many of the civilians who stayed sought refuge in the Nanking Safety Zone, established by the International Committee to provide protection during the Japanese advance. Members of the committee, including John Rabe and George Fitch, estimated roughly 200,000 civilians sheltering within its boundaries during December.

Japan's Attack Plans: Gas, Fire, and Total Destruction

As Shanghai fell, the Japanese Tenth Army drafted two contingency plans on November 30, 1937, outlining how they'd take Nanjing — one swift and brutal, the other catastrophic.

Plan A pursued a direct assault. Plan B, triggered if resistance intensified, abandoned chemical ethics entirely:

• Siege encirclement using just 2.5 divisions to contain the city
• Week-long incendiary bombing designed to systematically destroy structures, later confirmed by urban reconstruction records showing over one-third of buildings destroyed
• Mustard gas deployment targeting both population and defenses, explicitly framed as creating a "holocaust for one city"

Tokyo disagreed with field commanders on escalation, but General Matsui's army pressed forward, setting the stage for December's catastrophic capture. The city fell on December 13, 1937, after which mass executions and rape were carried out by Japanese soldiers in the weeks that followed. Japanese frustration stemming from the fierce resistance at Shanghai had fueled a desire for revenge, with 300,000 estimated murdered out of the 600,000 civilians and soldiers present in the city during the six weeks of carnage that followed. In a parallel of wartime brutality unfolding on the world stage that same year, Soviet forces would later demonstrate similarly ruthless disregard for civilian populations during the 1956 Hungarian uprising, killing over 5,000 people in the weeks preceding the infamous Blood in the Water water polo match at the Melbourne Olympics.

General Tang Sheng-chi's Defense Plans Against Japanese Forces

With Shanghai fallen and Japanese forces closing in, Chiang Kai-shek turned to General Tang Shengzhi to mount Nanjing's last stand. Appointed November 25, Tang assembled roughly 100,000 soldiers, including untrained conscripts and battle-worn Shanghai survivors.

His fortification logistics focused on reinforcing Zijinshan peak, Yuhuatai plateau, and a dense perimeter of trenches, machine-gun nests, and artillery. Tang's scorched earth orders burned structures within two kilometers of the city and along roads stretching sixteen kilometers outward, denying Japanese forces shelter. Boats were destroyed and roads blocked, further preventing many citizens from evacuating the endangered city.

Troop discipline proved brutal—Tang's elite 36th Division blocked the Yangtze docks, preventing retreat. When defenses crumbled under panic, he fought his own fleeing soldiers. Retreat coordination ultimately collapsed on December 12, when Tang escaped through Yijiang Gate without formally announcing surrender.

Japanese forces employed tanks, artillery, and aerial support to systematically dismantle Chinese defensive positions as they tightened their encirclement of the city.

How the Nanjing Safety Zone Became the City's Last Refuge

While Japanese forces tightened their grip on Nanjing, a group of Westerners—businessmen, journalists, and missionaries—organized the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone on November 22, 1937. They elected German businessman John Rabe to lead safety operations, leveraging his Nazi party membership amid the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact.

The international committee established a 2-square-mile zone in Nanjing's western district, sheltering over 250,000 refugees by December 13, 1937. You'd recognize their efforts through:

• Coordinated services: Police, utilities, fire departments, food supply, and sanitation
• Medical care: Three hospitals remained operational under Red Cross leadership
• Direct protection: Members physically placed themselves between Japanese soldiers and civilians

Despite partial disregard from Japanese forces, the zone became Nanjing's critical last refuge. The committee sent 61 letters to the Japanese Consulate reporting incidents of violence and abuse between December 13, 1937, and February 9, 1938. Firsthand accounts of the atrocities were compiled and published in newspapers and journals across the United States and Europe, including Reader's Digest stories in July 1938, bringing international attention to the ongoing crisis. Much like the consensus-based governance structures developed decades later in Nunavut, the Safety Zone committee operated through cooperative decision-making and shared responsibility among its members to maintain order and protect vulnerable populations.

The Village Massacres and Atrocities Committed During Japan's Advance on Nanjing

Japanese commanders didn't just target Nanjing's city center—they turned the entire 170-mile corridor between Shanghai and Nanjing into a killing field. Aircraft strafed unarmed farmers and refugees reportedly for fun, while ground troops systematically wiped out villages suspected of harboring guerrillas. Civilian testimonies documented horrific scenes: soldiers burning settlements, committing mass rapes, and executing anyone deemed physically capable of military service.

On November 29, the 3rd Battalion rounded up and machine-gunned eighty civilians in Changzhou village alone. Agricultural devastation compounded the human toll, as arson campaigns destroyed farmland and rural communities across outlying regions. Cantonese army units that broke Japanese encirclement triggered wholesale destruction of entire settlements in retaliation. These countryside atrocities accumulated into staggering death tolls that rivaled—and arguably exceeded—the killings occurring within Nanjing itself. Soldier Tsuzo Hasegawa's diary entry from December 16, 1937, recorded the burning of small villages in outskirts while advancing, confirming that the destruction of rural communities was a deliberate and documented pattern of Japanese military conduct.